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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of elections, partisan and political support effects on the dynamics 
of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980-2013. A GMM estimator is 
employed and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human 
development. Majority governments also influence it, but no evidence is found regarding partisan 
effects. The electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non-OECD countries, in countries with 
less frequent elections, with lower levels of income and human development, in presidential and 
non-plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing literature on political cycles has typically focused on the economic policy 
activity of governments. It is assumed that policymakers have strong incentives to align policy 
measures with the timing of elections and/or with the electorate‟s partisan preferences. As such it 
is expected that the economy exhibits clear economic cycles that closely track the electoral 
calendar. One fundamental assumption behind all politico-economic models is that voters prefer 
those candidates that can deliver them greater well-being. However, behind this hypothesis there 
is another one very well-known across all areas of economics: when we improve agents‟ 
economic prosperity, we deliver them more well-being. This Maslow-based view of people‟s 
needs puts economic concerns before any others, considering that the financial well-being is the 
only necessary condition for general well-being but, nevertheless, recognizing that it is not a 
sufficient condition. More so in cases where people‟s basic economic needs are satisfied, like for 
most individuals in prosperous democracies. 
Government turnover is another important feature for the consolidation of prosperous 
democracies. Therefore, elections and the uncertainty of remaining in office represent a big 
incentive for incumbents to implement measures that promote their re-election chances. There is 
no reason to think that they only implement measures targeting the economy. Instead it is safe to 
assume that they will target all aspects they think will benefit their chances of re-election. As 
such, effects of opportunistic manipulation in social dimensions are a possibility, thus 
intensifying the need to understand whether human development is also conditioned by political 
aspects like elections and the ideology of governments.  It is well known that data about GDP, 
income, unemployment, inflation, public debt and other macroeconomic aggregates does not 
provide information about all the important preferences of their real beneficiaries. Economic 
agents frequently value achievements such as better education and health services, broader 
participation in economic, cultural and political activities of the local community, improvements 
in working conditions and security against crime and physical violence, that are not necessarily 
reflected in higher income, output growth or aggregated public accounts. Moreover, while the 
purpose and ultimate goal behind any policy intervention must be to contribute to a more 
efficient allocation of resources, the aim of the policymakers in office is to survive public 
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scrutiny at the elections. To fulfil that objective they need to please voters, and this means that 
they must provide better public services (education, health, safety,..), implement measures to 
reduce inequality and unemployment, and to promote growth. These measures should have an 
important impact on the living standards of the population thus promoting not only economic 
growth but also human development. 
Hence, it seems sensible to consider other dimensions of development, instead of simply 
looking at economic variables, to draw the complete picture of democracy‟s effect on people‟s 
lives. In this paper, we try to move closer to the idea that governments supply more than 
economic well-being in exchange for votes and try to find evidence that the political cycle is not 
limited to the economic dimension, and thus putting empirical research a step closer to the 
reality. 
Contrary to economic growth, that is simply related to quantitative changes in a country‟s 
economy, economic development involves quantitative and qualitative changes in a country and 
reflects not only economic and technological progress but also social relations, health 
conditions, education standards, personal safety and social progress. It is a broader measure of 
key determinants of human well-being. However, defining and measuring economic 
development is not straightforward. Several alternatives have been developed to measure it 
combining a few indicators of economic development (Fleurbaey, 2009). The most commonly 
accepted is the Human Development Index (HDI), which was developed by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in 1990. This is a broad measure that covers multi-dimension 
aspects of economic development, especially, education, health and income (Sen, 1999). 
This study represents a first attempt of exploring the electoral dynamics of well-being, 
taking the advantage of using a broad human development indicator that encompasses not only 
the economic, but also social dimensions of a society. This will allow us to answer the forgotten 
question of whether and how human development is affected by political motives and electoral 
calendars in both developed and developing countries. Although the linkage between 
elections/ideology and the social components of the HDI are mainly done through public 
expenditures we think that investigating the end result of politics on the outcome variable HDI is 
of particular interest. To proceed with this analysis, we use data over a panel of 82 countries 
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during the period 1980-2013 to test for the presence of political cycles, partisanship, and 
government support effects on the growth rate of human development. A GMM estimator is 
employed in the empirical analysis and the results unveil the presence of political cycles in the 
human development: during election years human development tends to accelerate. Majority 
governments also exert a significant effect on it, but no evidence is found regarding partisan 
effects. Moreover, these political cycles are especially observed in developing countries, with 
lower income and lower levels of HDI, and in countries with less frequent elections. Additional 
evidence shows that they have become more intense in this millennium. Presidential and 
non-plurality systems and proportional representation regimes are also characterized by stronger 
political cycles. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the econometric model. The main results are 
presented and discussed in section 4. Some robustness checks are provided in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Measuring economic development and evaluating its behaviour to changes in economic, 
social, institutional and political variables has become an important task of several recent 
theoretical and empirical researches. Many studies have tried to construct measures of 
well-being. Fleurbaey (2009) summarizes three main approaches: adjusted GDP, happiness 
indices, and the Human Development Index. 
The adjusted GDP approach is based on welfare economics and aims to derive indicators 
of change in social welfare focusing on the intertemporal dimension of social welfare (Dasgupta, 
2001). In practice, this approach relies on capital stocks as the drivers of changes in the 
intertemporal well-being of individuals. However, although theoretically appealing, it suffers 
from practical implementation problems (difficulties of generating comparable measurements 
across countries) and conceptual weaknesses (it is based on the theory of revealed preference). 
The happiness approach – which is based on evidence from surveys on well-being (Frei and 
Stutzer, 2002) – also suffers from serious problems of comparability across time and space. 
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The Human Development Index (HDI) has been considered a more consensual measure 
of social welfare. Indeed, the 1990 Human Development Report and the seminal research by 
Fukuda-Parr and Shiva-Kumar (2003) have set the stage for much of the subsequent 
investigation that followed. According to the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2014), this is 
a summary index (geometric mean) of three essential dimensions of human development: (i) 
long and healthy life; (ii) access to knowledge and education; and (iii) decent and stable living 
standards. Ul Haq (1995) notices that it measures well-being and not just income by including 
both economic and social dimensions of well-being; additionally, its coverage and methodology 
is flexible enough to allow a measure of multi-dimensional well-being. Alkire (2007), Comim et 
al. (2008) and Molina and Purser (2010) also point out that the HDI allows for simple, replicable 
and comparable cross-country and within-country measures of human development. 
The HDI also presents some limitations such as weighting different aspects of life in the 
same way for all individuals, difficulties in comparing countries by other factors like the quality 
of schools or dropout rates, and the fact of the index values range between 0 and 1 which may not 
well reflect the differences between countries. Nevertheless, its practical advantages over the 
alternatives make it preferable is most empirical applications. Nafziger (2012) considers it as a 
better, more complete and multifaceted measure of human development than any other indicator 
or index, being useful for the qualitative aspects of development. Several studies, in different 
fields, have used the HDI as a measure of economic development and to test how it reacts to 
changes in important economic, social and political variables. For example, Ranis et al. (2005) 
show that child mortality is highly correlated with HDI; Timmer and Akkus (2008) assess the 
gender determinants of long-term human development; Wolfers (2009) finds that income per 
capita is highly correlated with HDI ranking;
1
 Davis (2009) and Martins and Veiga (2014) 
analyzes the effects of government size and the composition of public expenditure on economic 
development. 
This paper analyzes the existence of democracy related effects on the human 
development, with a special focus on the impact of elections and of government ideology. Due to 
the advantages discussed above, we use the HDI as the measure of choice to investigate the 
presence of politically induced development cycles.  
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The analysis of political cycles has essentially focused on the economic sphere, i.e. 
variables like GDP, unemployment, inflation and other macroeconomic variables, along with 
fiscal and debt formation variables (see, Franzese (2002) for an encompassing survey). The 
political business cycles and partisan theories are the main theoretical frameworks that indicate 
how governments affect macroeconomic outcomes. The political business cycles theories (PBC) 
are divided into models that assume agents with adaptive expectations (Nordhaus, 1975) and 
more recent models that adopt rational expectations (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Rogoff, 
1990). The main implication of these models is that all politicians implement expansionary 
economic policies before elections with the objective of maximizing their electoral support and 
afterwards contractionary measures are required to correct the artificial unbalance generated 
previously.
2
 If the objective of governments is to produce more economic well-being in order to 
generate more votes, we can easily extend the PBC theory to include social dimensions. 
Development features like better health and education along with other social protection and 
personal aspects of people‟s lives should improve near elections. Short-term policy shifts like 
increases in expenditures in these areas can generate the typical post electoral downturn after 
elections described by the theory. Studies like Blais and Nadeau (1992), Potrafke (2010), 
Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016) report the presence of PBC 
cycles in some welfare related expenditures.
3
 However, part of the development relies on 
structural policies, for which the post-electoral effect is hard to achieve. Nevertheless, we can 
assume that some structural non-economic shifts that take longer to come in effect can be timed 
by competent governments in order to produce at least some effects near elections. 
Regular government turnover is an important feature for the consolidation of democracy. 
Hence, elections and the expectation of a change in the government can be an incentive for 
incumbents to invest in long-term measures that promote development and increase their 
chances of reelection. 
Alternatively to the PBC theories, both the adaptive (Hibbs, 1977) and rational (Alesina, 
1987, 1988; Alesina and Sachs, 1988) versions of the partisan theory view politicians as 
heterogeneous, arguing that different parties have different policy objectives, behaving, when in 
office, in a partisan manner. Left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with unemployment 
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(growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially worried with inflation 
control.
4
 The effect of partisanship on the development of the welfare state has been widely 
debated and non-economic dimensions of State intervention like some welfare policies such as 
health, education and social protection have been considered (see Imbeau et. al. (2001) for a 
meta-analyses on the relationship between party ideology and government policies). Overall, the 
traditional assumption behind partisan effects is that left parties tend to promote the welfare 
intervention by the State, while right-wing governments are negatively correlated with State 
involvement in welfare. 
Left governments are assumed to want more state presence in people‟s lives and are also 
bigger spenders than right-wing parties. Hence, they are expected to be better providers of 
education, health and social security.
5
 However, Wilensky (1976) claims that there is a process 
of cross national convergence regardless of ideological concerns, arguing the industrialized 
countries report similar welfare states as a consequence of their similar levels of economic 
performance. 
Overall, the theoretical linkage between elections/ideology and the HDI is an indirect one. It is 
not reasonable to assume that governments manipulate the HDI directly for electoral purposes. Instead 
the relationship is mediated through policy, especially by public spending adjustments when it comes to 
social aspects. However, when dealing with social dimensions, the policies can be more than spending 
variations and include changes in the framework of the social dimension itself.  
As far as we are concerned, the presence of political cycles has never been tested in any 
indicator of human development. Nevertheless, some aspects of the relationship between human 
development and political systems have been analysed. For example, Gassner et. al. (2006) 
found that countries that have proportional systems tend to enjoy higher levels of human 
development, when compared to those with majority systems. Also, Miller (2015) shows that the 
existence of elections in autocratic regimes matters for human development: autocratic regimes 
with legal multiparty elections seem to outperform regimes without elections with respect to a 
wide range of human development outcomes. 
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3. Data and model specification 
To analyse the presence of political cycles in the human development, we had annual 
data for the HDI regarding 182 sovereign states over the period 1980-2013. However, to be 
included in our final sample a country must have regular competitive elections over the relevant 
period. To choose which countries to include we used the Legislative and Executive Indices of 
Electoral Competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) which scores 
countries on a scale of 1 to 7, and excluded those countries with a value lower than 6.  Adding to 
this, the presence of missing values for some variables, mainly for developing countries, made 
the number of available countries to 82 at most.
6
 
To tackle the problem of estimating the proposed relationship, one alternative would be 
to do a first-stage examination of what impact political variables have on social spending (health, 
education, etc) and in a second-stage explore the effect of these spending adjustments on the HDI. This 
fits the idea that the relationship between elections/ideology and the HDI is mediated by public spending 
adjustments. Although this method depicts more accurately the reality of social outcomes, it might not be 
so successful regarding the economic dimension of the HDI. It also reduces significantly the number of 
available observations. For these reasons – and because our main goal is to analyze the end result of 
politics on the outcome variable HDI – we chose a single equation approach to portrait the relationship 
and introduce some relevant variables for economic activity that we believe help isolate the effect of 
political variables. The dependent variable used is the growth rate of the Human Development 
Index (HDI_gr). The HDI is a measure of the average achievement in key dimensions of human 
development, namely: (i) a long and healthy life; (ii) being knowledgeable; and (iii) a decent 
standard of living. This index is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of those three 
dimensions. The data for those indices and HDI are provided by Human Development Report of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2014).
7
 
The explanatory variables included in the baseline model are the lag of HDI_gr (to 
account for the persistence in the adjustment), the set of the political variables of interest and 
some economic, institutional and demographic controllers. The political variables are provided 
by the Database of Political Institutions 2012 and by the Comparative Political Data Set I 2013: 
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- Elect_yr: a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the year of legislative elections; 
and 0, otherwise.A positive sign is expected for its estimated coefficient, meaning that 
political cycles are present in the growth rate of Human Development. 
- GovLeft: a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony or 
dominance of left-wing parties in the cabinet; and 0, otherwise (centre or right-wing 
parties). Our expectation is that left-wing governments are more concerned with Human 
Development than their centre or right-wing counterparts. 
- GovMaj: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single party or coalition has 
majority in the parliament; and 0, otherwise. Majority governments have enough support 
to promote development measures; however, the power they have to favour their own 
agenda and interests may not be favourable to human development, so no clear sign is 
anticipated for the coefficient on this variable. 
- GovCoal: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a coalition government is in 
office, regardless of having majority or not; and 0, otherwise. It is also difficult to 
anticipate a sign for its coefficient, as different interests may delay important measures or 
generate a consensus for the need of their implementation. 
- MajCoal: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a majority coalition 
government is in office; and 0, otherwise. It is equal to GovMaj*GovCoal. Once again, 
for the reasons indicated above, it is not easy to foresee the direction of its impact on 
HDI_gr. However, this is another important political dimension to be considered in this 
analysis. 
The additional set of variables includes controllers for the rating risk at economic, 
financial and political levels and for population growth. The data for the risk of rating variables 
comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the population data is obtained 
from the World Development Indicators. The variables are defined as follows:
8
 
- EcoRating: the economic risk rating is obtained by a weighted average of information on 
GDP per head, real GDP growth, annual inflation, budget balance over GDP and current 
account over GDP. The aim of this index is to provide compiled information on the 
general economic environment, strengths and weaknesses. A higher value for this index 
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represents a better and strength economic environment, which is expected to have a 
positive impact on human development.
9
 
- FinRating: The financial risk rating index includes foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, 
foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current account as 
a percentage of exports of goods and services, net international liquidity as months of 
import cover and exchange rate stability. The aim of this risk rating is to provide a means 
of assessing a country‟s ability to pay its obligations and to finance its official, 
commercial, and trade debt obligations. We also expect that a better rating will mean 
higher development. 
- PolRating: the political risk rating includes 12 weighted variables covering both political 
and social attributes.
10
 Its aim is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of 
the countries on a comparable basis. We conjecture that a better rating has a positive 
impact on human development. 
- Pop_gr: growth rate of total population. As a high population growth brings an increased 
pressure on the management of natural resources and over the socio-economic relations, 
we believe that it may also be detrimental for the growth rate of human development. 
The descriptive statistics for these and other related variables – that will be considered in 
some additional specifications/experiments – are reported in Table A.3 in Annex. To estimate 
the impact of those variables on the growth rate of the human development index, we consider 
the following dynamic panel data specification: 
 
HDI_grit=α+ρHDI_grit-1+βPolit+γRatingit+δPop_grit+θTimet+vi+eit        (1) 
 
where i=1,…,82 and t=1981,…,2013. Pol and Rating represent, respectively, the vectors of the 
political and risk rating variables. The coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable (ρ) 
measures its persistence. The vector β captures the impact of the electoral cycle, partisan and 
government support effects on HDI_gr, while the vector γ assesses the effect of the economic, 
financial and political environment controllers. The impact of population growth is given by the 
coefficient δ. Additionally, we also control for the passage of time by including the Time variable 
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in the specification. Regarding the last components, νi is the individual effect of each country i, 
and eit is the error term. 
Given the presence of individual effects νi, the model can be estimated assuming those 
effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable would be 
correlated with the error term, even if the latter is not serially correlated. This implies that OLS 
estimates (random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2008). Although the 
fixed effects (FE) estimator gains consistency as the number of time periods increases, the 
time-series dimension in this analysis might not be large enough (T=33) for us to rely entirely on 
its estimates.
11
 
The estimators that take into account that bias can be grouped into: (i) bias-corrected 
estimators; and (ii) instrumental variables estimators. Bias-corrected estimators, like the one 
proposed by Bruno (2005a, b) – the bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator 
(LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models – are suitable when the number of individuals (N) is 
small (and T is not large enough). Although T is not large in this study, the number of individuals 
cannot be considered small (N=82). Hence, this estimator may not be the most suitable procedure 
to solve the bias problem caused by the inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable in the list of 
regressors. 
According to the large sample properties of the generalized method of moments (GMM), 
the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate when there is a clear 
dominance of cross sections over time periods in the sample. This is what happens in our panel, 
which means that this estimator is a more appropriate procedure to solve the bias problem. 
Taking first differences of equation (1), levels of the explanatory variables can be used as 
instruments to avoid correlation between lagged dependent variable and the country-specific 
effects.
12
 Arellano and Bond (1991) also proposed a variant of the GMM estimator, namely the 
two-step estimator, which utilizes the estimated residuals in order to construct a consistent 
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. Although the two-step estimator is 
asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of 
homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of heteroscedastic 
errors. This result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999), who showed empirically that the 
  12 
one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator, especially when the number of time 
periods is relatively high (T=30), which is the case in this study. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest another GMM 
estimator with additional moment conditions. If they are valid, they will increase the efficiency 
of the estimators. This is known as the system GMM estimator, which combines the moment 
conditions of the model in first differences with those of the model in levels (differences are used 
as instruments for the level equations).However, if the orthogonality conditions for the 
first-difference equation are valid, but those for the level equation are not, then the system GMM 
may not be better than first-differences GMM. This can happen, for example, if the regressors 
used in the orthogonality conditions for the levels equation are correlated with the individual 
effects. Moreover, simulations suggest that the system GMM is not necessarily superior to the 
standard GMM in cases where the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series 
observations are relatively large (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Moshirian and Wu, 2012). This is 
what we observe in our data, so the estimator that seems to be more suitable for our empirical 
analysis is the one-step first-differences GMM estimator. 
Another problem that we have to deal with is the “too many instruments problem”. Using 
too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases. When the number of time periods is 
relatively large, this over-fitting becomes even more serious. The consequent large collection of 
instruments, even if individually valid, can be collectively invalid because they over-fit 
endogenous variables (Doornik et al., 2002; Roodman, 2009a, b). They also weaken the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions used to check instrument validity. Hence, to minimize the 
over-fitting problem we use the collapse alternative suggested by Roodman (2009b).The 
empirical results from this panel data analysis are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The findings of this study are reported and carefully discussed in this section. We start by 
considering several alternative estimators; then we dig deeper on the timing of elections and its 
frequency; the distinction between developed and developing countries and political systems is 
taken into account next;and some robustness checks are provided at the end of this section. 
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4.1. Initial estimates 
The results from the estimation of our baseline model are presented in Table 1. We report 
not only the results from the one-step and two-step differences and system-GMM estimators, but 
also the FE and LSDVC estimators (all with robust standard-errors). Despite our choice goes to 
the one-step differences-GMM estimator – for the reasons explained above – we consider a good 
practice, at this stage, to report the results of the other “competing” estimators. This is relevant 
not only to show their differences, but also – and more importantly – to emphasize the 
consistency of our main results. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Looking first at the results provided by our preferred estimator (column 1), we observe 
that during election years the growth rate of human development is significantly higher (around 
0.05 percentage points) than in non-election years.
13
 This means that the traditional political 
(business) cycles observed in GDP growth and public accounts/expenditures are also present in 
this broader dimension of well-being. This is a striking finding in the way it reveals the existence 
of an electorally determined cycle, thus highlighting the role of democratic features in shaping 
the growth path of human development. Nevertheless, the political orientation of the government 
seems to be innocuous for that path: left-wing governments are not more prone to promote 
human development than centre or right-wing parties. But majority governments (forming a 
coalition or not) have a marginal negative impact on the growth rate of human development, 
perhaps because they can set their own agenda without the need of reaching a broader consensus 
from other parties, which ends up having a negative effect on general well-being. 
As expected, another important result to emphasize is that the economic environment 
matters for human development: an improvement in the economic risk rating is immediately 
reflected on the path of human development. However, general financial and political 
enhancements and population growth have not proved to play a significant role in terms of 
well-being. Interestingly, the growth rate of human development has shown to decrease over 
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time, which indicates lower improvements in the general human development in the more recent 
years. 
These findings are robust to the choice of the kind of GMM estimator (one-step or 
two-steps; differences or system), but the system-GMM estimator has proved not to fit very well 
to the data. Contrary to the differences-GMM estimator,
14
 no persistency is found and the 
Hansen and differences-in-Hansen tests reject the validity of the instruments and the additional 
moment restrictions. Moreover, the main findings are also robust to the use of standardized 
variables (see column 5 in Table 1). The economic environment seems to impacts significantly 
on the HDI path. We might think that the magnitude of political cycle effects could be small, but 
it is not; when compared to the impact of EcoRating our election dummy reveals roughly 14% its 
impact while our majority governments dummy reaches 58% and both political variables remain 
quite strong and statistically significant.
15
 
The results are even robust to biased/inconsistent dynamic fixed effects estimator (see 
column 6 in Table 1), which might indicate that the bias can be negligible. In fact, correcting the 
bias with the LSDVC estimator does not generate significantly different results.
16
 Nevertheless, 
for the reasons indicated in the previous section, we proceed our analysis employing the one-step 
robust standard errors differences-GMM estimator. 
We also performed some experiments using the alternative estimation approach 
discussed in section 3 and did a first-stage examination of what impact political variables have on the 
expenditures related to the non-economic components of the index (health and education) followed by a 
second-stage, where we explore the effect of these spending adjustments on the HDI. Overall, the results 
found are consistent with those reported on Table 1, although depicting a slightly weaker relationship 
between political variables and development, probably related to the significant loss in the number of 
observations when using this approach (these results are available upon request). 
 
4.2.  Elections timing, political orientation and support, and institutional issues 
In the following set of experiments we test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the 
political variables, in the controllers and to cross effects between the variables. The results are 
presented in Table 2. We start by exploring the political cycle in greater depth, focusing on the 
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timing of the elections (columns 1-3). In a first approach, we check whether the government‟s 
behaviour starts to exert any significant effect on human development before election years. 
Thus, we add to the equation a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the year before the 
elections (BefElect_yr). The results show that the electoral cycle over the growth rate of HDI is 
only present in election years. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Next, we replace the BefElect_yr and Elect_yr variables by a dummy that takes de value 
of one in the year after the elections, and 0 otherwise (AftElect_yr).We found this effect to be 
statistically non-significant; we reject the presence of a full or complete opportunistic cycle in 
the data. 
Additionally, instead of using dummies to control for the electoral period, we employ a 
variable that controls for the timing of the elections by measuring the proportion of time that has 
elapsed since the last election, i.e. it measures the proportion of time a government is in office in 
a particular year, since it has been elected (TimingElect).
17
 The results are consistent with the 
idea that policymakers behave opportunistically: as elections approach they manipulate fiscal 
policy to improve welfare and well-being of their constituents in order to increase their support 
and maximize their chances of winning the elections. Regarding the other variables, the results 
remain unchanged. 
In the following experiments the other variables are replaced by some proxies. The 
dummy LeftGov is replaced by RightGov (which takes value one when a right-wing party is in 
office; 0 otherwise). Majority and coalition dummies are also replaced by the fraction of seats 
held by the government (Maj%, which is calculated by dividing the number of government seats 
by the total number of seats in the parliament). However, no significant coefficients are found for 
those proxies. 
Even though the political risk rating is never statistically relevant, we decided to test 
some of its components or related variables. Hence, in columns (6), we present the results with 
those that proved to be significant: the degree of democracy (Democracy, which is an index that 
represents a polity scale ranging from -10 to +10, i.e. strongly autocratic to strongly democratic; 
it is the „polity2‟ variable in the Polity IV Database); and a corruption index (Corruption, which 
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is published by the ICRG and ranges from 1 to 5, i.e. low corruption to high corruption). The 
results are in line with our expectations, since more democracy and less corruption are beneficial 
for human development.
18
 However, the effects of these institutional components of the political 
environment have not proved to be consistent. For example, when we add a variable to control 
for the size of government (GovSize) their statistical significance vanishes. Moreover, the size of 
government also appears not to influence the growth rate of human development in the group of 
55 countries for which the data is available.
19
 
In column (8) we report a regression with a composite risk rating (CompRisk) computed 
using the economic, financial and political risk rating variables. This composite rating is 
computed by the ICRG. The political risk rating contributes 50% of the composite rating, while 
the financial and economic risk ratings each contribute 25%. The results indicate that the better 
the general economic, financial and political environment is, the more the human development 
grows. However, we can easily conclude that this effect is mostly due to improvements in the 
economic conditions. 
In general, despite all these experiments, our main findings remain valid: elections and 
economic environment have a positive impact on the growth rate of human development, while 
majority governments tend to exert a negative influence. Additionally, we treat the risk rating 
variables as endogenous in the last regression in Table 2. Nevertheless, our results are not 
affected.
20
 
 
4.3.  Frequency of elections 
Another important issue to be considered in this analysis is whether the frequency of 
elections can affect the political cycle in the human development. Are longer cycles responsible 
for more opportunism than shorter cycles? Can human development benefit from low or high 
frequency elections? What „kind of democracy‟ might be better? To get some clues on how to 
answer these complex questions we have to find a way of identifying countries with different 
frequencies of elections. The most practical way is to divide them according to the average 
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duration of mandates: one with low durations (high frequency); the other with high durations 
(low frequency). 
The next challenge is to define the threshold between high and low frequencies. A very 
straightforward solution is to consider the average duration among the panel of countries used in 
our analysis: 3.8 years.
21
 Thus, we can estimate one model for the group of countries that present 
a high frequency of elections (average duration of mandates lower that 3.8 years), and other for 
the group with a lower frequency of elections (duration higher or equal to 3.8 years). The 
respective results are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. They are very clear in pointing 
out that political cycles are a characteristic of countries where governments‟ mandates are 
longer.
22
 These provide the necessary time for policymakers to develop and implement the 
(opportunistic) measures that will promote a significant increase in well-being, precisely when 
they need to maximize their political support, i.e. in the election years. As longer mandates are 
mainly a consequence of political stability, our results indicate that more politically stable 
democracies seem to be more prone to opportunistic manipulation. This is also consistent with 
the notion that some development measures are not short-term based, thus requiring more time to 
be implemented. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
This finding is confirmed when we run a regression with all countries but distinguishing 
elections in countries where they are more frequent (multiplying Elect_yr with the dummy 
MoreFreq that takes the value of one in countries with an average duration of mandates lower 
than 3.8 years: Elect*MoreFreq) from elections in countries where they are less frequent 
(multiplying Elect_yr with the dummy LessFreq that takes the value of one in countries with an 
average duration of mandates higher than 3.8 years: Elect*LessFreq). We also test whether the 
difference in the coefficients is significant (Diff_ElectFreq). Even though the difference is not 
statistically significant, only countries where governments have longer mandates present a 
significant political cycle on human development. This same conclusion is obtained if we 
replace Elect_yr by TimingElect and multiply it by MoreFreq (Timing*MoreFreq) and LessFreq 
(Timing*LessFreq). 
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These results have also proved to be robust to small changes in the threshold. We tried 
other ad hoc thresholds at 3.5, 3.6, 4, and 4.2 years but the results described above remained 
qualitatively unchanged. We also report the results using as threshold for the frequency of 
elections the mean duration of mandates observed in the sub-group of OECD countries (i.e. 3.4 
years – see columns 5-8), which are also the most developed countries in our sample. The results 
are in line with the ones reported above, pointing out to a clear political cycle in the countries 
with less frequent elections (i.e. frequency higher than 3.4 years). In this case, a significant 
difference between the two groups of countries is found when the variable TimingElect 
multiplied by the dummies for the frequency of elections is employed.
23
 
 
4.4. Advanced vs developing economies and political systems 
The literature on political business cycles has demonstrated that the opportunistic 
behaviour tends to gather more support in developing countries than in advanced economies (Shi 
and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2005, 2008; Vergne, 2009). To account for this issue 
in the human development, we separate the analysis in two sub-groups of countries: OECD 
countries (representing the advanced economies); and non-OECD countries (encompassing all 
the other less developed or developing economies). Moreover, we also distinguish high-income 
countries (HIC) from countries with lower income (LIC) and between countries with a high-HDI 
(HHDIC) and low-HDI (LHDIC).
24
 The results are presented in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
The results for the group of OECD countries are shown first, followed by the ones for 
non-OECD or less developed economies (see columns 1 and 2). Despite economic conditions 
being important in both sub-sets, we corroborate the idea that governments‟ opportunistic 
behaviour is a characteristic of less developed countries. In particular, human development rises 
more significantly during election periods in those economies than in more advanced ones. The 
effect in the OECD countries is almost negligible. When dummy variables are used to identify 
the two sets of countries and multiplied by Elect_yr (Elect*OECD and Elect*NonOECD) – in a 
similar way to what we have done in Table 3 for the frequency of elections – we confirm the 
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prominence of political cycles in the human development for non-OECD economies and that the 
difference to the group of OECD countries is statistically significant (see coefficient on 
Diff_OECD). 
The results reported in columns (4) to (9) are in line with the previous ones, in the sense 
that they show that countries with lower income and HDI are the ones in which the timing of the 
elections matter for the evolution of human development, with a significant difference relatively 
to the other groups (HIC or HHDIC).
25
 
The type of political regime/system may also play a role on how human development 
behaves.
26
 Issues like whether the system is presidential or not, whether there is plurality or not, 
and whether there is proportional representation or not deserve to be considered as different 
political systems can generate different outcomes. As these characteristics of the electoral design 
do not exhibit time variability we cannot explicitly include them in the model to control for their 
impact, because they are dropped in the GMM estimations. Thus, the alternative is to estimate 
separate regressions for each kind of political system/regime. Additionally, we can also evaluate 
the significance of the differences in the political cycle behaviour (Diff_#) by looking at the 
impact of the product between Elect_yr and a dummy for the respective regime (Elect*Presid 
and Elect*NonPresid; Elect*Plural and Elect*NonPlural; Elect*PR and Elect*NonPR), in a 
similar way to what we have done above.
27
 The results for the respective estimations are 
presented in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Presidential and non-plurality regimes and proportional representation systems are the 
ones in which human development exhibits an electoral cycle. These results are in line with the 
works of Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Gassner et. al. (2006). However, the difference for 
their counterpart systems/regimes has not proved to be very relevant (see coefficients on Diff_#, 
for each case) and partisan effects remain absent from all estimations. We also verify that despite 
economic conditions matter independently of the kind of political system/regime, majority 
governments tend to be more “active” in non-plurality systems and in proportional 
representation regimes. 
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4.5.  Robustness checks 
As the data for HDI and its three components (Life Expectancy, Education and Income 
indices) are only available for periods of five years between 1980 and 2000, the missing data 
were obtained by linear interpolation for each of its three components. The HDI was then 
computed as the cubic root of the product of those three components for the entire time period 
(1980-2013). To check for the robustness of our results, we did some additional regressions 
where different kinds of interpolations to obtain the missing values for HDI are used, as well as 
different time periods. To circumvent any remaining issues with interpolation, we also estimated 
the mode for shorter and more recent time periods (where fewer years are interpolated or where 
there is no interpolation at all): 1990-2013, 2000-2013, and 2005-2013. Independently of the 
kind of interpolation or time period considered, the results and conclusions of this study remain 
unchanged. However, we found that the magnitude of the coefficient on Elect_yr increases as we 
restrict the time period to more recent years, which points out to an intensification of political 
cycle over time and that this effect is concentrated in the group of non-OECD (or less developed) 
countries. 
 As the HDI variable is computed based on three important indices (Income, Education 
and Health indices), we also tried to understand which index contributes more for the political 
cycle identified in the growth rate of HDI (HDI_gr). That separate analysis indicates that besides 
income – that plays an important role – education standards also play a part, although a minor 
one, in explaining the presence of political cycles in the HDI. Hence, the evidences of political 
cycles found in this paper are not exclusively focused on income, but also show some social 
features. All results mentioned are available upon request. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study represents a first attempt of analysing the role of democratic features in the 
shaping of human development‟s growth path. The traditional analysis of political cycles has 
focused essentially on the business or economic cycle, and assumes that governments are only 
interested in providing economic well-being, thus neglecting other relevant dimensions that 
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economic agents tend to value like better education and health services, broader participation in 
economic, cultural and political activities of the local community, improvements in working 
conditions and security against crime and physical violence. Since the HDI, developed by the 
United Nations (UNDP), covers multi-dimension aspects of economic development, we use it to 
analyse the electoral dynamics of human development. 
Using data for 82 countries over the period 1980-2013 and employing a GMM estimator 
we were able to identify the presence of a political development cycle. During election years the 
growth rate of human development is significantly higher than in non-election years and 
probably the primary source of this may reside in public spending variations especially for social 
dimensions. It seems that governments near elections deliver more than strict economic 
well-being, and thus the standard economic cycle found in the literature is only a part of the 
actual socio-economic cycle generated by elections. We also found that the electoral cycle over 
the growth rate of HDI is only present in election years, nothing was found before or after, and 
that this cycle has become stronger in the recent years. This might mean that, as countries 
prosperity increases over time, politicians are more aware of voters‟ social preferences and the 
increasing value they put on non-economic well-being. 
Our results provide no evidence of left-wing governments being more prone to promote 
human development than other types of rulers. The political orientation of governments was 
consistently found to be innocuous for the growth path of human development. On the contrary, 
majority governments seem be associated with a decrease in the growth rate of human 
development. 
A further detailed analysis accounting for some important characteristics of democracies 
showed that human development rises more significantly during election periods in less 
developed countries than in more advanced ones (the effect found for OECD countries is almost 
negligible). Moreover, the opportunistic development cycle seems to be a characteristic of 
countries where government mandates are longer and of proportional representation systems. 
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1 Bloom and Friedman (1997), Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Bloom et al. (2003) also show that the drop in the 
economic dependency ratio has an impact on how human development evolves over time. 
2 Rational versions of opportunistic models tend to reduce the ability of policymaker's to induce the political cycle. 
Empirical studies suggest that favourable economic conditions do benefit governments (Hibbs, 2006).However, 
opportunistic behaviour appears to gather more support in developing countries (see, for instance, Shi and Svensson, 
2002a,b, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008; and Vergne, 2009). 
3 Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Aidt et al. (2011) and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) also 
found political opportunism at aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures but restricted to the 
municipal level of government. 
4 In general, empirical evidence points out that partisan behaviour seems to be more recurrent in developed 
countries (see Alesina et al., 1992, 1997). 
5 Studies that take a look at disaggregated public expenditures found none or weak support for partisan effects in 
welfare related areas. See, for instance Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016). 
6 The countries used in this study are listed in Table A.1 in Annex. 
7  For details on how the HDI is computed, see the Technical Notes of the Human Development Report at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. As the data for HDI and its three components (Life Expectancy, Education and Income 
indices) are only available for periods of five years between 1980 and 2000, the missing data were obtained by linear 
interpolation for each of the three components (more recent data are provided annually); then the HDI was 
computed as the cubic root of the product of those three components for the entire time period (1980-2013). A direct 
linear interpolation of HDI was also considered, as well as cubic and natural cubic spline interpolations, in some 
robustness checks. To circumvent any remaining issues with interpolation, we also report estimations for shorter 
and more recent time periods, where fewer years are interpolated or where there is no interpolation at all: 
1990-2013; 2000-2013; 2005-2013. However, independently of the kind of interpolation and time period used, the 
results and conclusions of this study remain unchanged. 
8 An increase in the economic, financial or political rating risk index means an improvement in the respective rating 
risk, i.e., that the economic, financial or political environment has improved. 
9 We prefer to control for the impact of the economy using this indicator instead of GDP or income per capita or 
other related variable. As one of the components of the HDI is precisely an income index, using those variables as 
regressors would certainly be highly correlated with HDI. 
10 The 12 components are: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucracy quality. For details, see ICRG at http://www.prsgroup.com. 
11 Judson and Owen (1999) notice that even for T=30 the bias can be as much as 20% of the true value of the 
coefficient of interest. 
12 For this difference in GMM estimator to be consistent, it must be ensured that there is no autocorrelation in the 
errors and no correlation between individuals in the residuals. The passage of time is considered in the specification 
to overcome this problem. 
13 Even though the magnitude of this effect seems small, we should note that, on average, the HDI grows very 
slowly over time. Hence, we cannot expect higher magnitudes for the estimated coefficients. 
14 The differences-GMM estimator requirements are fulfilled as the Hansen tests does not reject the validity of the 
instruments and there is autocorrelation in the first order but not of second order. 
15 We follow Gelman (2008) to standardize our variables. The author proposes dividing each numeric variable by 
two times its standard deviation, so that the generic comparison is with inputs equal to the mean ±1 standard 
deviation. The resulting coefficients are then directly comparable for untransformed binary predictors. 
16 In the LSDVC regressions, we employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator as the initial estimator, collapsing 
the instruments as suggested by Roodman (2009a, b). Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 50 repetitions of 
the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Nevertheless, results do not qualitatively change with 
different repetitions (25, 100 or even 200). 
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17 It is equal to 1 in the election year. 
18 Aidt (2011) provides evidence of a negative impact of corruption on sustainable development. 
19 GovSize is the „fi_sog‟ index in the Economic Freedom of the World published by the Fraser Institute. Despite 
those effects are not relevant in our sample, Martins and Veiga (2014) have found a significant impact of 
government size on human development in a larger panel of 156 countries and using a convergence specification 
with 5-year time spans. Our sample only includes countries with established democracies. 
20 We also tried to test for government turnover effects using a dummy that accounts only for those elections in 
which there are changes in the ideology of the government, but, in this case, no significant impact was found on 
human development. Additionally, we tested for the presence of interaction effects between Elect_yr and GovLeft, 
GovMaj and EcoRating, but the respective coefficients were also always statistically insignificant. These results are 
not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request.  
21 Another option could be to consider differences in the constitutional duration of terms in each country. However, 
we would face the problem that, in general, they are not very different (usually set at four years). 
22 For the countries in each sample see Table A.1 in Annex. As the number of countries is low when we split the 
sample, an LSDVC was also used. The results – not reported here to save space - have proved to be very similar. 
23 The results for the additional covariates are not reported to save space, but they are available upon request. 
24 High-income countries are those are those that, according to the World Bank in 2014, have a GNI per capita of 
$12,736 or more. For the high-HDI group are considered those that, according to the United Nations Development 
Program, have an HDI higher than 0.800. 
25 The HIC, LIC, HHDIC and LHDIC variables in the specifications (multiplied by Elect_yr) are dummies that take 
the value of one if a country belongs to that group (the differences between the respective coefficients are given by 
Diff_IC and Diff_HDI). An LSDVC estimator was also used for each sub-sample, but the results did not change. 
They are not shown here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
26 Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Gassner et. al. (2006) show that electoral cycles differ across political systems. 
27 Presid takes de value of one in presidential systems, i.e. when the head of government is also head of state and 
leads an executive branch separated from the legislative branch, and 0 otherwise (NonPresid). Plural takes the value 
of one in plurality systems, i.e. when legislators are elected using a „winner-take-all‟ rule, and 0 otherwise 
(NonPlural). PR takes the value of one in proportional representation regimes, i.e. in those regimes in which 
candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party, and 0 otherwise (NonPR). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Political cycles in the growth rate of human development 
 DifGMM1 DifGMM2 SysGMM1 SysGMM2 DiffGMM1S Dyn-FE LSDVC 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) 
        
L.HDI_gr 0.376*** 0.329*** 0.189 0.156 0.277*** 0.352** 0.403*** 
 (0.097) (0.108) (0.150) (0.146) (0.108) (0.156) (0.024) 
Elect_yr 0.054** 0.037** 0.051** 0.035** 0.035** 0.053** 0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.027) 
GovLeft 0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.038 -0.032 -0.030 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.020) (0.030) 
GovMaj -0.152* -0.116 -0.136 -0.088 -0.151* -0.155** -0.145*** 
 (0.083) (0.076) (0.086) (0.081) (0.089) (0.061) (0.045) 
GovCoal -0.079 -0.064 -0.080 -0.050 -0.049 -0.066 -0.062 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.077) (0.081) (0.087) (0.047) (0.038) 
MajCoal 0.091 0.055 0.094 0.046 0.076 0.123** 0.114** 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.062) (0.055) 
EcoRating 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.260*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.075) (0.005) (0.003) 
FinRating 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.051) (0.003) (0.003) 
PolRating -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.026 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.087) (0.003) (0.002) 
Pop_gr -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 -0.040 -0.032 -0.022** -0.019 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052) (0.057) (0.011) (0.016) 
Time -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
        
        
R2      0.194  
# Observations 1616 1616 1717 1717 1616 1717 1717 
# Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
# Instruments 40 40 42 42 40   
Hansen J-test 0.147 0.147 0.032 0.032 0.146   
Diff. Hansen test   0.081 0.081    
AR(1) 0.007 0.017 0.000 0.042 0.000   
AR(2) 0.802 0.876 0.824 0.770 0.857   
        
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. One-step and two-steps differences and system GMM estimates are 
reported in columns (1)-(4); column (5) reports the results with standardized variables and column (6) the results for a 
dynamic fixed effects estimator. Bruno‟s (2005a, b) LSDVC estimates are shown in the last column. The lagged dependent 
regressor is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; their lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used 
as instruments in the first-difference equation; the lagged first-differences of the lagged dependent variable were also used in 
the levels equation in the system GMM estimations; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many 
instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the 
Diff-in-Hansen test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for the system GMM. The 
values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first 
differences equations. 
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Table 2. Elections timing, political orientation and support, and institutional issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.313*** 0.383*** 0.427*** 0.366*** 0.371*** 0.420*** 0.382*** 0.393*** 0.303** 
 (0.106) (0.092) (0.097) (0.101) (0.095) (0.098) (0.092) (0.097) (0.121) 
Elect_yr 0.053***   0.039** 0.054** 0.042** 0.041** 0.048** 0.051** 
 (0.016)   (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) 
BefElect_yr -0.010         
 (0.032)         
AftElect_yr  -0.018        
  (0.016)        
TimingElect   0.060**       
   (0.025)       
GovLeft -0.010 -0.013 0.018  0.013 0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.026 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.029)  (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) 
GovRight    0.020      
    (0.035)      
GovMaj -0.177** -0.151* -0.130* -0.157*  -0.215** -0.247** -0.147* -0.170** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.087)  (0.101) (0.104) (0.087) (0.077) 
GovCoal -0.079 -0.072 0.019 -0.097  -0.052 -0.077 -0.095 -0.050 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.056) (0.092)  (0.094) (0.094) (0.087) (0.079) 
MajCoal 0.112 0.083 0.050 0.107  0.119 0.153 0.090 0.122 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.077) (0.087)  (0.097) (0.095) (0.090) (0.084) 
Maj%     -0.099     
     (0.157)     
EcoRating 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.024***  0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) 
FinRating 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
PolRating -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 -0.003    0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)    (0.004) 
Democracy      0.051* 0.041   
      (0.027) (0.026)   
Corruption      -0.047* -0.039   
      (0.028) (0.027)   
GovSize       0.024   
       (0.037)   
CompRating        0.017***  
        (0.004)  
Pop_gr -0.033 -0.049 -0.049 -0.026 -0.049 -0.052 -0.071 -0.047 -0.058 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.028) (0.034) (0.079) (0.084) (0.035) (0.038) 
Time -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.007** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
          
          
#Observations 1572 1584 1539 1503 1620 1134 1081 1616 1616 
#Countries 81 82 82 81 82 56 55 82 82 
#Instruments 41 40 40 40 38 41 41 38 121 
Hansen J-test 0.168 0.140 0.138 0.140 0.141 0.221 0.147 0.163 0.894 
AR(1) 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 
AR(2) 0.935 0.825 0.749 0.765 0.831 0.650 0.568 0.729 0.907 
          
Notes: See Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%, and *, 10%. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is employed in all estimations. The lagged dependent regressor is 
treated as endogenous (in regression 9 the economic, financial and political risk rating variables are also treated as endogenous); 
their lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; they were collapsed 
to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the 
first differences equations. 
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Table 3. Frequency of elections 
 Average frequency of all countries Average frequency of OECD countries 
 < 3.8 yrs > 3.8 yrs Elect3.8 Timing3.8 < 3.4 yrs > 3.4 yrs Elect3.4 Timing3.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
L.HDI_gr 0.308* 0.365*** 0.377*** 0.431*** 0.578*** 0.333*** 0.377*** 0.430*** 
 (0.187) (0.124) (0.096) (0.097) (0.081) (0.115) (0.096) (0.097) 
Elect_yr 0.049 0.070**   0.026 0.077**   
 (0.034) (0.035)   (0.023) (0.038)   
Elect*MoreFreq   0.045    0.025  
   (0.034)    (0.020)  
Elect*LessFreq   0.067**    0.075**  
   (0.034)    (0.038)  
Diff_ElectFreq   -0.022    -0.050  
   (0.048)    (0.041)  
Timing*MoreFreq    0.033    0.007 
    (0.032)    (0.027) 
Timing*LessFreq    0.097***    0.094*** 
    (0.032)    (0.032) 
Diff_TimingFreq    -0.064    -0.087** 
    (0.042)    (0.039) 
         
         
# Observations 749 867 1616 1539 410 1126 1616 1539 
# Countries 32 50 82 82 21 61 82 82 
# Instruments 40 40 41 41 40 40 41 41 
Hansen J-test 0.272 0.420 0.148 0.138 0.883 0.391 0.154 0.139 
AR(1) 0.074 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.011 
AR(2) 0.632 0.794 0.808 0.764 0.896 0.839 0.822 0.739 
         
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2, and Table A.1 in Annex. When the number of countries is low (when the sample is split), an LSDVC estimator was also 
used, but the results were similar; moreover, the results for the additional covariates are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon 
request. 
 
Table 4. Advanced economies, income and human development 
 OECD vs Non-OECD countries High vs Low Income countries High vs Low HDI countries 
 OECD NonOECD Dummy HIC LIC Dummy HHDIC LHDIC Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.398*** 0.395*** 0.378*** 0.499*** 0.322*** 0.380*** 0.515*** 0.316*** 0.381*** 
 (0.063) (0.118) (0.096) (0.059) (0.123) (0.095) (0.066) (0.120) (0.095) 
Elect_yr 0.008 0.099**  0.008 0.116**  0.010 0.111**  
 (0.018) (0.046)  (0.017) (0.053)  (0.018) (0.050)  
Elect*OECD   0.016       
   (0.018)       
Elect*NonOECD   0.094**       
   (0.045)       
Diff_OECD   -0.078*       
   (0.047)       
Elect*HIC      0.017    
      (0.015)    
Elect*LIC      0.116**    
      (0.056)    
Diff_IC      -0.099*    
      (0.056)    
Elect*HHDIC         0.015 
         (0.016) 
Elect*LHDIC         0.109** 
         (0.052) 
Diff_HDIC         -0.094* 
         (0.053) 
          
          
# Observations 837 779 1616 924 692 1616 892 720 1616 
# Countries 34 48 82 41 41 82 37 45 82 
# Instruments 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 
Hansen J-test 0.418 0.206 0.146 0.239 0.405 0.146 0.212 0.306 0.155 
AR(1) 0.000 0.024 0.007 0.000 0.033 0.007 0.000 0.030 0.007 
AR(2) 0.681 0.880 0.797 0.973 0.961 0.817 0.681 0.844 0.809 
          
Notes: See Tables 1-3 and respective notes; see also Table A.1 in Annex. The results for the additional covariates are not reported here to 
save space, but they are available upon request. 
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Table 5. Presidential systems, plurality systems and proportional representation 
 Presidential vs Non-Presidential Plurarily vs Non-Plurality Prop.Representation vs Non-PR 
 Presid NonPresid Dummy Plural NonPlural Dummy PR NonPR Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.229* 0.472*** 0.377*** 0.342*** 0.433** 0.376*** 0.490*** 0.183 0.375*** 
 (0.119) (0.180) (0.096) (0.122) (0.177) (0.097) (0.106) (0.142) (0.097) 
Elect_yr 0.061* 0.045  0.059 0.041*  0.057** 0.043  
 (0.032) (0.034)  (0.039) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.049)  
Elect*Presid   0.062*       
   (0.036)       
Elect*NonPresid   0.049       
   (0.033)       
Diff_Presid   0.014       
   (0.046)       
Elect*Plural      0.060    
      (0.040)    
Elect*NonPlural      0.049**    
      (0.023)    
Diff_Plural      0.011    
      (0.044)    
Elect*PR         0.055** 
         (0.027) 
Elect*NonPR         0.052 
         (0.058) 
Diff_PR         0.003 
         (0.062) 
          
          
# Observations 771 844 1615 857 754 1611 1308 304 1612 
# Countries 46 36 82 46 35 81 62 19 81 
# Instruments 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 17 41 
Hansen J-test 0.308 0.251 0.149 0.175 0.206 0.143 0.212 0.262 0.141 
AR(1) 0.000 0.050 0.007 0.047 0.001 0.007 0.022 0.006 0.006 
AR(2) 0.954 0.853 0.798 0.347 0.075 0.798 0.139 0.387 0.800 
          
Notes: See Tables 1-4; see also Table A.1 in Annex. In regression (8) instruments for the dependent variable are collapsed and reduced to a 
maximum of 7 lags. The results for the additional covariates are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request.  
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ANNEX 
 
 
 
Table A1.Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
HDI 4160 0.635 0.172 0.192 0.950 
HDI_gr 4025 0.799 0.887 -7.646 13.512 
Elect_yr 2380 0.257 0.437 0 1 
TimingElect 2242 0.642 0.281 0.091 1 
GovLeft 1924 0.354 0.478 0 1 
GovRight 1881 0.504 0.501 0 1 
GovMaj 2337 0.743 0.437 0 1 
GovCoal 2372 0.566 0.496 0 1 
MajCoal 2331 0.426 0.495 0 1 
Maj% 2354 57.711 15.101 9.278 100 
EcoRating 3778 33.780 7.180 0 50 
FinRating 3778 34.698 8.675 4 50 
PolRating 3778 64.303 15.146 9 97 
CompRating 3778 66.435 13.737 14 96 
Corruption 3795 3.004 1.354 0 6 
Democracy 2824 3.473 6.910 -10 10 
GovSize 2407 5.708 1.548 1.237 9.934 
Pop_gr 5241 1.665 1.529 -6.343 17.625 
Time 5447 28.081 9.978 1 34 
      
Notes: Data for 182 countries over the period 1980-2013; Due to missing values for some variables, the number of countries 
used in the estimations is reduced to 82. Those countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
Sources: The data for HDI comes from the Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program 2014 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/data). The political variables were obtained from the Database of Political Institutions 2012, World 
Bank (http://www.worldbank.org) and Comparative Political Data Set I 2013 (http://www.cpds-data.org/). The Rating and 
Corruption variables come from the International Country Risk Guide (http://www.prsgroup.com). Democracy is the 
‘polity2’ variable in the Polity IV Database. The GovSize is the ‘fi_sog’ index in the Economic Freedom of the World, Fraser 
Institute, (http://www.freetheworld.com/).The data for Pop_gr comes from the World Development Indicators, World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
